Approved For Release 2001/09/05: CIA-RDP80T01719R000100030004-7

SENSITIVE

CIA/SAVA /WVIND 700425



# WEEKLY VIETNAM INDICATORS

Week Ending 25 April 1970

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
For the President Only

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
# SOUTH VIETNAM WEEKLY INDICATORS

1968-1970 Weekly average for each month **1968** ---1969 -0.1970 Nov 3 500 400 300 200 100

**OCTOBER 1969-APRIL 1970** Weekly data as reported, Feb-Mar-Apr Weekly average per month, Oct-Jan





US BATTLE DEATHS again declined to the month's low of 95 from last week's 101.







490. The official total will change as late reports are received and will be lower than figures released to the press by the GVN.







since December of last year. The total number of infiltrators detected since 23 October 69 remains at some 59,000-60,500.






compared to last week's 942, but were not of a significant nature.






decreased to 2,368 from last week's 2,962.



Dotted line shows current average for April 1970



of enemy killed by RVN forces dropped to 57% from last week's high of 67%.

Statistics for the latest week shown are preliminary

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# Enemy Activity

Enemy-initiated activity this week was again characterized by scattered attacks by fire and light ground probes at a reduced level. Evidence continues to accumulate that the Communists are preparing to launch another series of widespread but limited attacks similar to those noted during the initial phase of the current campaign on 31 March - 1 April. A 28 March directive from the Communist head-quarters for South Vietnam (COSVN) suggests that a change in emphasis for the remainder of this campaign is in the offing. The directive calls for continuous, sustained pressure against the allies over the next several months as opposed to the "high points" followed by long periods of reduced activity that characterized most of 1969. The pacification effort is to come under increasing attack since defeat of pacification is listed in the order as the "most pressing central mission of the 1970 campaign." The directive acknowledges that conventional military activity is still important, but stresses that it should be used as a "lever" to promote spontaneous uprisings in the hamlets and villages.

# Enemy Infiltration

During the past week, no new infiltration groups were detected in either Laos or North Vietnam. No battalion size groups have been detected entering the pipeline in nearly three weeks and it now appears probable that a decrease in infiltration similar to that of last year is occurring.

In the logistics field, the monsoon rains appear to be delaying the completion of the enemy's "crash" program, originally scheduled to end about 30 April. Transportation units in the Laos panhandle have recently been ordered to increase road maintenance so that the roads can be used until 30 May.

# South Vietnam Developments

There has been a generally mild reaction in South Vietnam to President Nixon's 20 April troop-reduction announcement, with most sources accepting the withdrawal as a natural step for which the country has made preparations. Military officials generally indicated that the statement contained no surprises, and they approved of the greater flexibility provided by the plan to stretch the withdrawals over a year. Some politicians expressed concern that the statement suggested an independent status for the NLF and a possible abandonment of "free elections," and the economic impact of the withdrawals was noted by some. Apprehension may increase among local military commanders when specific U.S. withdrawal plans become known.

Results of the Hamlet Evaluation System (HES/70) show that the population "within GVN security" (i.e. in A, B, or C hamlets) increased by 1.2 percent during the month of March, rising to 89.7 percent. The VC population declined a fraction to reach an even two percent. Despite this overall gain for the government, 13 provinces retrogressed, primarily as a result of increased enemy military presence. The biggest setback occurred in Phu Yen Province (13.5 percent) where the enemy has been conducting a strong antipacification effort.

## Communist Developments

Recent hints that all of the high-level Communist personalities associated with the peace talks may soon leave Paris suggest that Hanoi may have decided to downgrade the talks temporarily while concentrating on a broader approach to the Indochina situation. The Communists may calculate that there are new and better opportunities for eroding Allied firmness in Laos and Cambodia where U.S. ability to intervene is more limited. Hanoi may also calculate that a Communist disengagement from Paris which would suggest that the talks there are on the verge of breaking up could stimulate anti-war sentiment around the world, particularly in the U.S., and increase the political pressures on the U.S. Government.

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In northern Laos, the military situation remains generally quiet, but light, scattered shellings and ground probes by the Communists have maintained pressure on the war weary Meos. The enemy continues to prepare for large-scale attacks in the near future on these friendly forces who have been in almost constant heavy contact for the past year.

Meanwhile in Cambodia, no large-scale westward movements of Communist units have been noted. Harassment of provincial and district towns continues, however, as the Communists endeavor to expand their control over large portions of eastern and southeastern Cambodia.

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Hanoi has now told COSVN not to differentiate between South Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia "in fighting U.S. aggression," and that Cambodia will be liberated before South Vietnam. To this end, COSVN has been ordered to expand "liberated areas" in Cambodia, to set up a "Khmer Route Government and Liberation Army," and to divert large numbers of military advisors and political workers from South Vietnam to Cambodia. Another reliable source reports efforts in a Delta province to recruit a new military unit for duty in Cambodia. These moves contrast with an earlier (27 March) COSVN directive which called for a low risk holding policy in Cambodia.

A multi-national conference of "Indochinese peoples" was held on 24 and 25 April, probably in southern China. Sihanouk may have attended. The Communists appear to be developing a large, all-Indochina front organization they can use to screen their activities in Laos and Cambodia as well as in South Vietnam.

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